how to not interfere?

The Code means whatever the Presiding Quaesitor and the majority of the voters at Tribunal want it to mean.

If this was the case there would be no code, just opinions about shit.

Modern legal theory and procedure don't apply.

I didn't mention modern legal theory or procedure. Firstly, what I described, the breaking down of an offence into constituent parts is not a modern practice. It dates to Roman times and the provision of a mental element was part of roman law as well as canon law. The revival of roman law and the influence of canon saw the secular authorities incorporate the element of mens rea from the 12th century onward.

Identifying facts that "could form an offence" is not out of the mythic paradigm, but it's not how the Order of Hermes forms its law,

It is not correct that everyone just votes at tribunal to convict or not convict. There is a dedicated pre-tribunal procedure where the PQ gives a view as to whether the facts (once the conflict between them have been eliminated) have merit when the code is applied to them. In other words, "could they sustain a conviction". Most of the cases are resolved this way, not at Tribunal. In modern terms this would be referred to as a directions hearing.

Nor is in correct to say that facts do not form the basis for hermetic law. Facts form the basis of all codes of conduct, systems of laws, rules or procedures in every culture. If facts don't form the basis for it than what does? Air, love, good-will? I think you are trying to say the content of the facts don't matter. It might be the case that some tribunals might take that view sometimes but that does not mean that facts do not form the basis for hermetic law. Facts are the whole foundation for the system. There is a great deal of the material in HOH:TL about test cases and proposal rulings. There is also the requirement that facts must be produced at both private and public hearings.

A tribunal has a basic vested interest in seeing a consistent code applied both by itself and its officers. If any idiot could level irrelevant facts on a consistent basis and achieve consistent convictions based on the "vibe" or lack of popularity, part of the glue that bound the order together would disintegrate.

Misusing facts, or misinterpreting them has beset all tribunals of law since the dawn of time. Wrongful convictions, lazy juries, dumb jurors, incompetent judges. It was why the appeal courts were created in the 1800's because first instance decisions were so riddled with error, so often. There is no reason why the same thing does not effect hermetic tribunals.

You state that there are examples of violations of the rule against interfering with mundanes that do not fit the fact pattern I describe. That could simply be first instance error and the order of hermes is very medieval in that regard because it has no machinery to reverse its own legal errors. But it is true that the elements I suggested might not fit most of the situations given in say HOH:TL. That's because at the time I was only seeking to give myself short term amusement. However I promise give it a go if people want me to. Why dont you throw some more examples on the thread and I will have a go.

Ironically it would fit the example you provide regarding the creation of precious metals. The precious metals issue basically comes down to inflation or worse outright theft if the silver is not made with vis. Hindering, obstructing or impeding are all made out if Pierre the peasant cannot buy bread anymore because of price inflation in his village. Or because the silver that he got from selling the covenant a herd of goats suddenly disappeared.

Secondary question- can a complaint be filed in another tribunal, or would that have to wait to go to the grand tribunal? For example, say said covenant is in Hibernia, and the King of England has granted the land to one of his nobles as the nominal Lord of Ireland for him to go set up a parish in.
The magi's mundane representative basically says "you and what army?" Noble says "why this army of course" the magi do some impressive magic and the mundane representative says "which army was that?"
The Hibernian tribunal, not being fond of the English, never bother to file a complaint. (or someone might if they got too flashy and left too many witnesses, but for the point of this question, they didn't)
Can a magus in the Stonehenge tribunal file a complaint in Hibernia? If they do have to bring this to the grand tribunal can they ask for a ruling, does it need to be referred to the Hiberian tribunal for judgment, or should they be asking to change the boundaries of the tribunals to match political boundaries?

Has the action brought ruin on the Stonehenge Covenant? If not then I would guess the case is ignored.

Not only that, one would have to convince the Prima Bonisagus to put the issue on the agenda...

I can't recall where, but I really do seem to recall that defending one's covenant - including servants etc. - against attacking mundanes is not considered interference... So if a nobleman arrives and tells you "swear fealty or else!", and you answer "else!", and he brings an army to your doorstep, and you turn that army to cinders (or frogs, or animated corpses), you are not in violation of the Code.

I didn't say that, and everyone seems to be misinterpreting what I mean. There is most certainly a Peripheral Code and a precedent, it's just one that's decided by democratic process. (That said, the latter does sometimes subvert the former. See: the Rhine Tribunal's ghost voting.)

I think we're talking past each other because I never said that, and I didn't say that the facts didn't matter (except, of course, in a Tribunal where the rule of law has fallen apart, such as the Rhine). I said that the law is not determined directly from the facts but by Tribunal decision.

The procedure is that the Quaesitor determines the facts of the case, and then the Tribunal decides whether the facts of the case are a violation of the Code. A resolution at the Quaesitorial level is not a directions hearing, it's an out-of-court settlement or a plea-bargain. To continue the analogy, a case where a Presiding Quaesitor vetoes a conviction is a directed verdict, and a case where a conviction is denied in blatant defiance of the Code is jury nullification. Accordingly, however, you get situations where legal precedent is set by a blatant runaway jury.

The thing is that "do the facts constitute a Code violation?" is a question answered through the democratic process, and the precedents that the Tribunal sets (along with proposals by magi) are what form the law. So I'd still say that you're looking at things backwards, because the Order works the opposite way from a modern court; the judge is the judge of the facts, the jury is the judge of the law. Furthermore, there aren't necessarily going to be firmly-established definitions of the fact pattern needed for a conviction; instead, what you get is the consensus agreement of the whole Tribunal as to whether or not any particular set of facts fits, based on the wording of the Code, the situation, and any prior precedents (in other words, it's a common-law system). And yes, whether it does is going to partly depend on how politically powerful the prosecutor and defendant are.

A magus of Stonehenge can complain to the Hibernian Tribunal; what's the complaint, though? Has the covenant harmed the magus by defending themselves?

Any magus might complain, although some Tribunals may have local rules about who may speak at Tribunal.

The Stonehenge magus might also or instead complain to the Stonehenge Tribunal, if the harm fell on him in the context of Stonehenge. E.G. the magus is known to the king to be Irish, and the king decided to seize his covenant's land after being frustrated by the Hibernian covenant.

I don't know how this would play; the action was in one tribunal, and the harm fell in another.

Look Ramidel, I don't really understand what you are trying to say. Your position shifts. Some of the stuff you state is not clear. Its relevance is not clear. I'm not even sure why you objected in the first place since you seem to have abandoned part of your initial objection.

You are not even correct about a key part of the tribunal procedure. You seem to gloss over the Private Hearing and treat the Public Hearing as the key event despite the explicit statement that most matters are resolved in Private Hearing. This leads in my view to the fatal flaw; which is that the Public Hearing is the sole source of Hermetic law for you. Clearly if you read HOH:TL the private hearing is a judicial body in its own right and would be a source of law in its own right.

A private hearing is not "out of court." Just because it says its private does mean its "out of court". Wanna have debate about when a court is in fact a court? Wanna have a read of real world case law about when a court is in fact a court? Have a read of Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 127 ALR 1; (1995) 183 CLR 245 (23 February 1995).

It is quite clear using any of the real work case-law that the Private Hearing exercises judicial power and is therefore a court. For example, the damned thing can give summary judgment which means it can declare the facts proven, convict and sentence all at the same time. That ain't no private conference.

Furthermore, you ignore Proposal Rulings in favour of Case Rulings. Proposal Rulings are designed to create a set of of common principles for prosecutions. See page 55. There is no reason why a tribunal could not in such a ruling adopt the formula I laid out, that would than be applied in both the private and public hearings.

Acknowledged, but the private hearing also not a full-court hearing and, crucially, requires the agreement of the defendant, who can always force the Quaesitor to bring it to Tribunal (which may be the better option if he's got enough sigils in his favor). So okay, it's not an out-of-court settlement, but it also isn't going to make a binding precedent for the Tribunal (which I wouldn't classify as an appeals court as much as an en banc hearing).

Anyway, regarding proposal rulings, I see now what you're trying to say: not that the formula exists, but that it could be adopted. That's true, and correct. I wouldn't generally do that in my saga unless the players wanted to do a story about introducing it, but then I tend to assume a highly-politicized and somewhat corrupt Order that wouldn't have much use for rigid formulae when "any reasonable magus" can determine whether an action is a Hermetic crime (even if it's not clear at all).

This sounds awfully familiar to me, too.

If the magi intentionally went and plonked their covenant on the doorstep of some nobleman then sure, there's a case for interference. If the nobleman went hiking into the forest and came across a previously undiscovered tower with a small village and some magi and then starts throwing demands, I'm pretty sure it isn't a violation to tell the noble to get lost (possibly with some CrMe assistance).

In fact, it might be a violation to NOT tell the noble to get lost, because said noble might then decide to try the same trick on the next magi; at which point the first covenant has now caused trouble for the second by their actions...

'I shall not interfere' isn't carte blanche to be used as a doormat. If someone comes threatening to burn your house down, take him at his word.

And if another covenant decides to set up a noble to do this to you? That sounds entirely like interference such that it brings ruin on one's sodales; there's a tribunal case there, it just isn't against you.